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We challenge the assumption that having multiple alternatives is always better than a single alternative
by showing that negotiators who have additional alternatives ironically exhibit downward-biased per-
ceptions of their own and their opponent’s reservation price, make lower demands, and achieve worse
outcomes in distributive negotiations. Five studies demonstrate that the apparent benefits of multiple
alternatives are elusive because multiple alternatives led to less ambitious first offers (Studies 1–2)
and less profitable agreements (Study 3). This distributive disadvantage emerged because negotiators’
perception of the bargaining zone was more distorted when they had additional (less attractive) alterna-
tives than when they only had a single alternative (Studies 1–3). We further found that this multiple-
alternatives disadvantage only emerges when negotiators used quantitative (versus qualitative) evalua-
tion standards to gauge the extremity of their offers (Study 4), and when they base their offers on their
own numerical alternative(s) versus on opponent information (Study 5).
 2016 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Inc. This is an openaccess article under the CCBY license (http://
creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
‘‘Get as many offers as you can, then you’ll have more negotiation
leverage.”
[Pouideh (2005), Secrets from Graduate School, p. 205]
‘‘[. . .] from a purely rational economic maximization perspective, to
get more power in the employment marketplace means to collect
offers (as many as possible) and keep them valid (for as long as
possible).”
[Kurtzberg and Naquin (2011), The Essentials of Job Negotiations,
p. 16]
The quotes above reflect a central assertion of research on
power and negotiations that has become almost a truism: The
more alternative offers negotiators can secure, the more leverage
they have, and the more they can demand from their opponent.
This belief is grounded in a variety of research domains, including
economics and psychology. For example, classic economic models
have traditionally assumed that humans are driven by their prefer-ences. According to rational choice theory (Hotelling, 1929; von
Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944), more choice alternatives are
always better than fewer alternatives because they allow individu-
als to maximize utility by identifying the best match between their
preferences and their alternatives. Similarly, psychological
research suggests that – when given a choice – individuals prefer
more over fewer alternatives because of the anticipated benefits
additional alternatives seem to provide (e.g., Iyengar, Wells, &
Schwartz, 2006; Reibstein, Youngblood, & Fromkin, 1975).
Thus, it is not surprising that negotiation scholars and practi-
tioners often recommend obtaining multiple alternative offers
because these are assumed to lead to a distributive advantage rel-
ative to few alternatives (or a single alternative). This recommen-
dation relies on the idea that ‘‘the bargaining partner who has
more alternatives is more powerful” (Yan & Gray, 1994, p. 1481)
and that negotiators with few alternatives are at a disadvantage
because they cannot walk away as easily from the bargaining table
(e.g., Mannix & Neale, 1993; McAlister, Bazerman, & Fader, 1986;
Pinkley, 1995; for a review see Thompson, Wang, & Gunia, 2010).
Indeed, when we asked 55 professionals pursuing a Master of Busi-
ness Administration (MBA) whether they preferred negotiating a
job offer with four alternatives or a single alternative (see Appen-
dix A for details), an overwhelming majority preferred having
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expected to negotiate better deals with multiple alternatives than
a single alternative (p < 0.001). These findings suggest that people
prefer multiple alternatives over a single one – likely because of
the distributive advantage they anticipate from having additional
alternatives.
In contrast to the recommendations made by negotiation schol-
ars and people’s preference for more alternatives, we propose that
the perceived advantage of multiple alternatives may be elusive
and that multiple alternatives can in fact hurt a negotiator’s perfor-
mance. In making this prediction, we build on recent anchoring
research suggesting that multiple anchors can be more potent than
single anchors. The scale distortion theory of anchoring (Frederick
& Mochon, 2012; Mochon & Frederick, 2013) argues that anchors
exert a scaling effect such that they shift the subjective (or impli-
cit) response scale on which people make judgments, which then
results in an assimilation of judgments towards those anchors.
For example, people who first estimated the calories in a straw-
berry subsequently judged medium-sized French fries to be less
caloric than people who first estimated the calories in a pizza.
Moreover, scale distortion theory suggests that the subsequent
assimilation of judgments on objective scales intensifies as the
number of anchors increases (Mochon & Frederick, 2013). Building
on the scale distortion theory of anchoring and prior findings that
negotiation alternatives serve as salient anchors (Schaerer, Swaab,
& Galinsky, 2015), we propose that compared to having a single
alternative, multiple alternatives can lead to a greater downward
distortion of negotiators’ perceptions of the bargaining zone, such
that they judge their own and their opponent’s reservation prices
to be lower. Because negotiators use the perceived bargaining zone
to gauge their initial demands, we predict that negotiators will
construe their first offer as more extreme when they have multiple
alternatives (vs. a single alternative), thereby leading to a down-
ward adjustment of the first-offer size (i.e., less ambitious
demands) and less profitable agreements.
Our research makes several contributions to the negotiation,
anchoring, and decision-making literatures. First, it extends our
understanding of the impact of alternatives on negotiation out-
comes. Theories on negotiation and power have generally assumed
that more alternatives help rather than hurt negotiators. However,
our research tests for the first time a counterintuitive and detri-
mental effect of multiple alternatives on negotiation outcomes.
Second, we contribute to the ‘‘anchoring in negotiation” literature
which has primarily relied on the anchoring-and-adjustment
framework (Epley & Gilovich, 2006) and the selective accessibility
model (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) – neither of which currently
provides an explanation for why multiple alternatives would bias
negotiators more strongly than a single alternative. We argue that
scale distortion theory provides such an explanation. In addition,
we illuminate the underlying processes and boundary conditions
of scaling effects and show that distortion is a pervasive phe-
nomenon with profound implications for competitive social inter-
actions. Third, this research puts forward a parsimonious account
of how alternatives affect first-offer magnitude and negotiation
outcomes through perceptions of the bargaining zone. Contrary
to research that often provides negotiators with a pre-
determined bargaining zone (e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001;
Larrick & Wu, 2007), we show that the focal negotiator’s construal
of the bargaining zone is malleable and subject to contextual influ-
ences. Finally, this research is the first to examine the perceived
bargaining zone as a key antecedent of first offers. This is an impor-
tant contribution because past research has primarily focused on
the consequences of the first offer and largely ignored its
antecedents.2. Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations
The bargaining zone is a fundamental concept in negotiation
research and refers to the distance between two negotiators’ reser-
vation prices—the price at which individual parties prefer an
impasse to an agreement (see Raiffa, 1982). For example, if a seller
is willing to accept any price above $8 and a buyer is willing to
accept any price below $12, the bargaining zone lies between those
two reservation prices ($8–$12).
Past research has generally treated the bargaining zone as fixed
(e.g., Blount, Thomas-Hunt, & Neale, 1996; Galinsky & Mussweiler,
2001; Kim & Fragale, 2005; Larrick & Wu, 2007; Pinkley, 1995;
Pinkley, Neale, & Bennett, 1994; White & Neale, 1994; Wolfe &
McGinn, 2005). For example, Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001) pro-
vidednegotiatorswithpre-determined reservationprices in the task
materials. Other research manipulated the size of the bargaining
zone as an independent variable (e.g., Larrick & Wu, 2007), or
assumed that negotiators gradually form an understanding of the
bargaining zone during the negotiation (e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994).
Extending this research, we argue that in the eyes of a negotiator
the bargaining zone is malleable and can be affected by contextual
cues before the negotiation has even started. One important contex-
tual cue lies in the alternatives that parties have available to a nego-
tiated agreement. Alternatives are often represented numerically
and can act as salient anchors that influence negotiators’ first offers
and final agreements (Schaerer et al., 2015) – even when additional
reference points are available (Blount et al., 1996) and even when
negotiators are highly experienced (Northcraft & Neale, 1987).
Given the critical role of anchors in negotiations, we propose
that numerically represented alternatives shape a negotiator’s
implicit perception of the bargaining zone. This hypothesis builds
on the scale distortion theory of anchoring (Frederick & Mochon,
2012; Mochon & Frederick, 2013). This theory suggests that the
perceived magnitude of a number can be influenced by other
numeric values on the same objective scale. To test their theory,
Frederick and Mochon (2012) asked one group of participants to
estimate the weight of a small animal on an objective numerical
scale (e.g., a raccoon, which weighs 20 lb). Another group was
not asked to make such an estimate. Then, all participants assessed
the weight of a much larger animal using the same scale (e.g.,
‘‘How many pounds does a giraffe weigh?”). Frederick and Mochon
found that participants reported lower numbers for the giraffe’s
weight when they were first exposed to the weight of the raccoon
than when they did not make this comparison. This anchoring
effect occurs because prior exposure to the lower raccoon weight
causes people to subsequently estimate the giraffe’s weight as
lower, not because people believe the giraffe is lighter, but rather
because they operate on a distorted response scale to communi-
cate their unchanged mental representation of the giraffe. Whereas
a 1000-lb giraffe might have seemed like a reasonable response in
the absence of an anchor, this number seems too large when con-
trasted with the 20 lb the raccoon weighs. Moreover, this distor-
tion of the weight scale does not affect related estimates such as
the height of the giraffe or how many lions a giraffe might feed,
and only emerges when comparisons are made on the exact same
scale (e.g., distortion is less likely to occur when the giraffe’s
weight is expressed in tons rather than pounds).
Scale distortion theory has important implications for the
impact of multiple anchors on subsequent judgments. If numeric
anchors affect the representation of scales, it is likely that such
an effect is amplified as people are exposed to a greater number
of anchors prior to making an overt judgment. In support of
this prediction, Mochon and Frederick (2013, Study 2) found that
people estimated the price of a television as lower when they were
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compared to when they were first asked to estimate the price of
only a clock radio or a fax machine. The stronger anchoring effect
occurs because exposure to multiple anchors leads to a stronger
contrast effect among the anchors. For example, the price of a fax
machine (e.g., $50) may seem rather high when presented together
with the price of a clock radio (e.g., $10). In contrast, the price of
the same fax machine may be much harder to judge in the absence
of the $10 radio-anchor and would thus appear as neither particu-
larly high nor low. Thus, when subsequently asked to estimate the
price of a TV, people who were exposed to multiple anchors (and
perceive a value of $50 as ‘‘high”) will select a lower value to reflect
the fact that a TV is much more expensive than a fax machine com-
pared to those who were exposed to a single anchor (and perceive
a value of $50 as, say, ‘‘moderate”).
This logic allows us to make predictions for how the exposure to
multiple alternatives (versus a single alternative) affects negotia-
tors’ perception of the bargaining zone. Specifically, given a partic-
ular alternative, the presence of additional less attractive
alternatives creates a contrast effect among those alternatives. This
contrast effect then leads to an assimilation effect in negotiators’
assessments of their own and their opponent’s reservation prices.
For example, an alternative of $75 for a coffee maker is likely to
look rather high when it is contrasted with two additional alterna-
tives of $70 and $65. The same $75 may seem neither extremely
high nor low when the comparison standards of $70 and $65 are
absent. The contrast effect between the three alternatives
downward-biases negotiators’ subsequent assessment of their
own reservation prices such that they may believe that an ambi-
tious reservation price for themselves may already be reached at,
say, $80. On the other hand, negotiators with only one alternative
of $75 do not experience this contrast effect and may feel that an
ambitious reservation price will only be reached at, say, $90. The
same logic should apply to negotiators’ estimation of their oppo-
nents’ reservation prices. A negotiator with multiple alternatives
who already perceives a value of $75 as relatively ‘‘high,” will likely
think that the opponent’s reservation price is much lower (e.g.,
$100) than a negotiator who perceives his or her only alternative
of $75 as, say, ‘‘average,” and the opponent’s walkaway point as
much larger (e.g., $120). Thus, multiple alternatives relative to a
single alternative should lead to a contrast effect that causes a
downward-shift (i.e., distortion) of one’s own reservation price
and the perceived opponent reservation price.
The distorting effect of numeric alternatives on negotiators’
perceptions of the bargaining zone has important downstreamOwn RP
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Fig. 1. Bargaining zone distortion in negotiations. The perceived bargaining zone, boun
downward in the case of multiple alternatives (right side) relative to a single alternativeconsequences for the remainder of the negotiation. We hypothe-
size that a negotiator’s construal of the bargaining zone determi-
nes the size of his or her subsequent first offer. Picture again the
negotiator from above who has three alternatives and perceives
the bargaining zone to span a range of $80–$100. This negotiator
would likely make a less ambitious first offer than a negotiator
with a single alternative who perceives his or her bargaining zone
to range from $90 and $120. Thus, if the exposure to multiple
alternatives results in a more downward-biased bargaining zone
than the exposure to a single alternative, negotiators with multiple
alternatives will also demand less from their opponent. Stated
formally:
Hypothesis 1. Compared to negotiators with a single alternative,
negotiators who have additional (less attractive) alternatives
perceive their own and others’ reservation prices to be closer to
the value of their alternatives.Hypothesis 2. Compared to negotiators with a single alternative,
negotiators who have additional (less attractive) alternatives make
less ambitious first offers.Hypothesis 3. The effect of multiple alternatives on first offers is
mediated by negotiators’ perceived own and opponent reservation
prices.
These predictions have important downstream consequences
because the extremity of the first offer strongly predicts final nego-
tiation agreements—especially in distributive negotiations in
which negotiators strive for diametrically opposed outcomes
(Gunia, Swaab, Sivanathan, & Galinsky, 2013; Loschelder, Swaab,
Trötschel, & Galinsky, 2014). In fact, the extremity of the first offer
can account for up to 85% of the variance in negotiation outcomes
(e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Schaerer et al., 2015). Because
first offers constitute one of the most important determinants of
outcomes in distributive negotiations (see Maaravi, Ganzach, &
Pazy, 2011), we propose that negotiators also obtain less profitable
outcomes when they have multiple alternatives rather than a sin-
gle one (see Fig. 1 for a schematic representation of our bargaining
zone distortion model).
Hypothesis 4. Compared to negotiators with a single alternative,
negotiators who have additional (less attractive) alternatives
achieve less profitable agreements.nt
Final 
agreement
Perceived
bargaining 
zone
First 
offer
Multiple Alternatives
ded by the perceived opponent and own reservation prices (RPs), will be shifted
(left side), resulting in less extreme first offers and less profitable final agreements.
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outcomes is sequentially mediated by negotiators’ perceived
own and opponent reservation prices and the extremity of their
subsequent first offers.3. Overview of the present research
We tested our hypotheses across five studies. Studies 1 and 2
tested whether the presence of multiple alternatives would distort
the perceived bargaining zone more strongly and lead to less
extreme first offers than a single alternative. Study 2 ruled out
the alternative explanation that negotiators with multiple alterna-
tives merely anchor on a lower average value and tested competing
mechanisms for the detrimental effect of multiple alternatives on
first offers. Study 3 involved an interactive face-to-face negotiation
and tested the complete causal model of bargaining zone distortion
by assessing whether the number of alternatives affected final
agreements and whether this causal relationship is sequentially
mediated by the perceived bargaining zone and extremity of the
first offer. The final two studies provide additional demonstrations
of our theoretical model by experimentally manipulating the pro-
posed scale distortion mechanism (see moderation-of-process;
Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005). Specifically, Study 4 tested the
assumption that scale distortion emerges when numeric scales
are used, but is mitigated when negotiators also have an alterna-
tive, qualitative evaluation standard available to gauge the extrem-
ity of their first offers. Finally, Study 5 tested the assumption that
scale distortion only emerges when the determination of the first
offer directly follows an exposure to one’s own alternatives, by
manipulating whether the focal negotiator or the opponent moves
first.4. Study 1: Multiple alternatives and first offers
The first study tested the impact of multiple alternatives on
negotiators’ perceived bargaining zone and first-offer extremity
(Hypotheses 1–3). We predicted that negotiators with multiple
alternatives would make less ambitious first offers than those with
a single alternative and that this detrimental effect of multiple
alternatives on first-offer extremity occurs due to bargaining zone
distortion. Specifically, we predicted that the relationship between
alternatives and first offers would be mediated by negotiators’
lower own and opponent reservation price estimates.2 We also measured negotiators’ perceived power using a 4-item scale (e.g.,
Schaerer et al., 2015; Swaab, Phillips, & Schaerer, 2016). We found that negotiators in
the multiple alternatives condition (M = 5.62, SD = 1.12) felt more powerful than4.1. Participants and design
Three hundred individuals (mean age = 34.98, SD = 10.76; 51.3%
female) were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk in
exchange for $1.00. Participants were randomly assigned to one
of three conditions: single alternative/high value, single alterna-
tive/low value, or multiple alternatives. Prior to data collection,
we decided to exclude duplicate responses, inattentive partici-
pants, and outliers. Fifty-one participants were excluded due to
duplicate IP addresses (10 participants), because they failed an
attention check (4), or because they made extreme first offers that
fell outside 2.5 times the Mean Absolute Deviation (MAD) from the
median (37), a method recommended by Leys, Ley, Klein, Bernard,
and Licata (2013). We applied these criteria consistently across all
online studies. The remaining 249 observations were analyzed.11 Although we decided to exclude outliers prior to data collection, we also analyzed
the data including outliers (N = 286). Identical effects emerged for reservation prices
(ps < 0.007) and first offers (p < 0.001).4.2. Procedure and manipulations
Participants first completed an audio test to ensure that they
could properly hear the recorded voice messages, which were used
to manipulate the number of alternatives. Participants then read
their role instructions and were told that they had just moved into
a new apartment and that they had received a brand new, fully-
automatic coffee machine from their parents. They also read that
they already possessed a functioning coffee machine for which
they had paid $400, and that they would keep the new machine
and advertise the old one for sale on the Internet. The instructions
then indicated that participants received inquiries about the coffee
machine via email and voicemail. Participants first read an email
from a buyer who was ostensibly looking for a coffee machine
and asked for an initial offer (see Appendix B).
Before responding to this email, participants were exposed to
the alternatives manipulation. The number of alternatives was
manipulated by having participants listen to (the) message(s) on
their voicemail recorder. Two female research assistants, whose
native language was English, each recorded two different voicemail
messages (see Appendix B). All messages contained similar lan-
guage and were equal in length. In the high-value condition, partic-
ipants always listened to one voicemail with an alternative offer of
$90. Those in the low-value condition always received an offer of
$80. Participants in the multiple alternatives condition listened to
both messages ($80 and $90). Message content, recorded voice,
anchor values (multiple alternatives conditions only), and presen-
tation order of the recordings (multiple alternatives conditions
only) were randomized. After listening to the messages, partici-
pants completed the dependent measures.
4.3. Dependent measures
4.3.1. First-offer extremity
Participants were asked what their initial offer to the buyer
would be. The extremity of the first offer served as the key depen-
dent measure.
4.3.2. Perceived bargaining zone
The perceived bargaining zone was measured by asking partic-
ipants to indicate the minimum price they would be willing to
accept in the current negotiation (own reservation price) and what
they thought the highest price was that the email buyer would be
willing to pay (opponent reservation price). Negotiators’ perceived
bargaining zone served as the mediating construct.
4.3.3. Manipulation and attention checks
To make sure that our manipulation had the intended effect,
participants were also asked to indicate how many alternative
offers they had available and what the value of their best offer was.
At the end, participants completed an attention check
(Oppenheimer, Meyvis, & Davidenko, 2009) and demographic
questions.2
4.4. Results
4.4.1. Manipulation check
The manipulation was successful. Participants in the multiple
alternatives condition indicated that they had more alternativethose in the single alternative conditions, (M = 5.15, SD = 1.18, F(1,247) = 8.05,
p = 0.005, d = 0.40. Although these results are in line with our argument that multiple
alternatives can have apparent psychological (power) benefits over a single alterna-
tive, we do not report these results in the main text because first offers and outcomes
were our primary focus, but report them here for transparency reasons.
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Fig. 2. Study 1: Negotiators with multiple alternatives exhibited a relatively more
distorted bargaining zone and made less ambitious first offers than those in the
single alternative conditions. Error bars indicate ± 1 SEM.
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dition (M = 1.06, SD = 0.41), F(1,246) = 442.64, p < 0.001, and those
in the low alternative condition, (M = 0.97, SD = 0.18), F(1,246) =
553.47, p < 0.001. The high and the low alternative conditions also
significantly differed (p = 0.031).3 In addition, negotiators in the
low-value condition reported their best alternative to be lower
(M = 80.11, SD = 1.05) than those in the high alternative condition
(M = 90.00, SD = 0.00), U = 45.00, p < 0.001, and those in the multiple
alternatives condition, (M = 89.85, SD = 1.21), F(1,246) = 4603.22,
p < 0.001. The latter two conditions did not differ (p = 0.31)4.4.2. Perceived bargaining zone
We predicted that the detrimental effect on first-offer extremity
would occur because two alternatives would distort the perceived
bargaining zone to a greater extent than either of those alterna-
tives alone (Hypothesis 1). This is exactly what we found (see
Fig. 2). Negotiators in the multiple alternatives condition perceived
the opponent’s reservation price to be lower (M = 103.60,
SD = 22.26) than those in the single alternative conditions,
(M = 135.30, SD = 44.57, F(1,247) = 31.39, p < 0.001, d = 0.80. This
effect also emerged when the high-value condition (M = 139.22,
SD = 38.26), F(1,246) = 31.16, p < 0.001, d = 1.14, or the low-value
condition (M = 131.42, SD = 49.95), F(1,246) = 19.09, p < 0.001,
d = 0.72, were contrasted separately with the multiple alternatives
condition. There was no significant difference between the two sin-
gle alternative conditions (p = 0.19).
Identical patterns were found for negotiators’ own reservation
price. Those in the multiple alternatives condition chose a lower
reservation price (M = 87.53, SD = 15.43) than those in the single
alternative conditions, (M = 107.27, SD = 29.15), F(1,247) = 28.17,
p < 0.001, d = 0.75. This difference was significant irrespective of
whether the single alternative value was high (M = 110.94,
SD = 24.53), F(1,246) = 31.37, p < 0.001, d = 1.10, or low
(M = 103.64, SD = 32.83), F(1,246) = 14.92, p < 0.001, d = 0.63.
There was a marginally significant difference between the two sin-
gle alternative conditions (p = 0.060).44.4.3. First-offer extremity
We predicted that negotiators with multiple alternatives would
make less extreme first offers than those with only a single alter-3 When we excluded participants who did not report the correct number of
alternatives when completing the manipulation check (N = 8), our predicted effects
for reservation prices and first offers remained identical (all ps < 0.001).native (Hypothesis 2). The results supported these predictions
(Fig. 2). Negotiators with multiple alternatives (M = 104.78,
SD = 12.08) made less extreme first offers than those in the single
alternative conditions, (M = 149.64, SD = 47.96), F(1,247) = 57.97,
p < 0.001, d = 1.08. This difference was significant irrespective of
whether the single alternative value was high, (M = 157.67,
SD = 44.87), F(1,246) = 64.66, p < 0.001, d = 1.61, or low
(M = 141.69, SD = 49.81), F(1,246) = 31.70, p < 0.001, d = 1.02. As
expected, negotiators who received the high alternative made
more extreme first offers than those who received the low alterna-
tive, F(1,246) = 6.89, p = 0.009, d = 0.34.
4.4.4. Mediation analysis
We conducted mediation analyses to examine whether negotia-
tors with multiple alternatives made lower first offers because
their perceived bargaining zone was relatively more distorted than
that of negotiators with only one alternative (Hypothesis 3). We
compared the multiple alternatives to the most conservative single
alternative condition (i.e., low value) and used a contrast variable
as the independent variable (1 for the single alternative/low
value condition; +1 for the multiple alternatives condition). The
analysis showed a significant indirect effect of the contrast variable
on first-offer extremity through negotiators’ perceived bargaining
zone—that is, the perceived opponent reservation price, CI95
[7.89; 1.91], and the own reservation price, CI95 [9.74;
2.73], see Fig. 3.4
4.5. Discussion
Study 1 demonstrates for the first time that, despite the appar-
ent and intuitive benefits multiple alternatives seem to provide,
having two instead of one alternative caused negotiators to make
less extreme first offers. Mediation analyses revealed that this
effect occurred because the presence of multiple alternatives dis-
torted the perceived bargaining zone to the negotiator’s disadvan-
tage: participants perceived their own and their opponent’s
reservation price as lower than in the single-alternative conditions.
5. Study 2: Average value and alternative mechanisms
Study 2 had three goals. First, it tested whether the multiple
alternatives detriment would be robust to a different number of
alternatives in the multiple alternatives condition with different
anchor values. Second, Study 2 aimed to test the possibility that
negotiators simply anchor on a lower average value in the multiple
alternatives condition when the best alternative is held constant
across conditions. To do so, Study 2 included three different multi-
ple alternatives conditions for which the mean value of the alterna-
tives was lower, equal to, or higher than the value of the single
alternative.
Third, Study 2 sought to rule out competing mechanisms for the
effect of multiple alternatives on first offers. Although we propose
a cognitive explanation for why multiple alternatives lead to lower
first offers, it is possible that social inferences are also at play. For
example, it could be argued that multiple alternatives in Study 1
lowered first offers because they led them to believe that asking
for more was unfair (i.e., interpersonal justice; see Bies & Moag,
1986; Colquitt, 2001). After all, having a lot of leverage could cause
negotiators to voluntarily give away some of their share to the
opponent (see also Handgraaf, Van Dijk, Vermunt, Wilke, & DeThe indirect effect was also significant when the multiple alternatives condition
was compared to the one alternative/high value condition instead (opponent
reservation price: CI95 [9.81; 2.59]; own reservation price: CI95 [12.43;
5.77]), or when the high and low value conditions were combined (opponent
reservation price: CI95 [5.77; 1.66]; own reservation price: CI95 [7.22; 3.26]).
-12.76 (3.27)*** 
Opponent RP 
First offer  Number of Alternatives 
Own RP 
.34 (.06)*** 
-16.63 (3.52)*** / -6.35 (2.48)* 
-7.24 (2.16)*** .81 (.09)*** 
Fig. 3. Study 1: Bargaining zone perceptions (i.e., opponent and own RPs) mediated the causal relationship of negotiators’ number of alternatives on first-offer extremity.
Regression coefficients are unstandardized with SEs in parentheses. RP = Reservation Price. ⁄ p < 0.05, ⁄⁄ p < 0.01, ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0.001.
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alternatives demanded less because they were more concerned
about preserving face and making a bad impression on others if
they acted too greedily (Brown, 1968; Pruitt & Johnson, 1970). A
third possibility is that the greater number of reference points pro-
vided by the multiple alternatives could have led to greater price
confidence – confidence in what the approximate value of the nego-
tiation itemmight be on the market. Finally, it is also plausible that
multiple alternatives caused negotiators to infer that their oppo-
nent must possess a lot of power as well. Negotiators often infer
opponent power based on their own power (Pinkley, 1995;
Pinkley et al., 1994). Thus, Study 2 examined whether interper-
sonal justice concerns, face concerns, confidence, and perceived
opponent power could account for the causal relationship between
alternatives and first-offer extremity.
5.1. Participants and design
Four hundred and one individuals (mean age = 35.38,
SD = 11.50; 53.6% female) were recruited from Mechanical Turk
in exchange for $1.00 and randomly assigned to a single alternative
condition or to one of three multiple alternatives conditions. We
excluded 82 participants using the same pre-determined criteria
as in Study 1, leaving 319 observations.5
5.2. Procedure and manipulations
Participants received the same task as in the previous study. In
contrast to Study 1, participants listened to one or to three voice-
mail messages (see Appendix B). All messages contained similar
language and were equal in length. Participants in the single alter-
native condition listened to a single voicemail message, for which
the alternative offer was always valued at $75. Participants in the
multiple alternatives conditions listened to three voicemail mes-
sages. The alternative offers were valued at $85, $80, and $75 in
the higher average condition, at $80, $75, and $70 in the equal aver-
age condition, and at $75, $70, and $65 in the lower average condi-
tion. Message content, recorded voice, anchor values (multiple
alternatives conditions only), and presentation order of the record-
ings (multiple alternatives conditions only) were randomized.
After listening to the messages, participants completed the depen-
dent measures.
5.3. Dependent measures
As in Study 1, participants reported their first offer, as well as
their perceived own and opponent reservation price.5 When we analyzed the data including outliers, we found the same significant
effects for reservation prices (ps < 0.001) and first-offer extremity (p < 0.001).In addition, we measured four potential alternative mecha-
nisms. Interpersonal justice was measured using an adapted scale
(Bies & Moag, 1986; Colquitt, 2001) asking participants to indicate
whether demanding more than their best alternative would be
‘‘impolite,” ‘‘disrespectful,” ‘‘not treating the buyer with dignity,”
and ‘‘an improper request” (1 = to a small extent; 5 = to a large
extent; a = 0.94). Face concerns were measured using a scale
adapted from Oetzel and Ting-Toomey (2003) asking participants
to indicate the extent to which they were worried about protecting
their own face (e.g., ‘‘I was concerned with not bringing shame to
myself,” ‘‘I was concerned with protecting my self-image;”
1 = strongly disagree, 7 = strongly agree; a = 0.91). Price confidence
was measured with a 5-item scale asking participants to indicate
how confident they were about the actual value of the negotiation
item (‘‘I was confident about how much I could ask for the coffee
machine,” ‘‘I was certain about the market value of the coffee
machine,” ‘‘I felt like I had a good understanding of the price range
for coffee machines,” ‘‘I had a good understanding of the range
within which the actual value of the coffee machine would fall,”
and ‘‘It was easy for me to reliably estimate the coffee machine’s
true value;” 1 = completely disagree, 7 = completely agree;
a = 0.89). Finally, perceived opponent power was measured using
the 4-item scale used in Study 1 and adapted from Schaerer et al.
(2015); see also Swaab et al., 2016). Specifically, participants indi-
cated how powerful (1 = powerless, 7 = powerful), strong (1 = weak,
7 = strong), confident (1 = unconfident, 7 = confident; a = 0.92), and
how much in control (1 = no control, 7 = in control) they believed
their opponent to be.
Finally, all participants completed the same manipulation and
attention checks and demographic questions as in Study 1.
5.4. Results
5.4.1. Manipulation check
The manipulation was successful. Participants in the multiple
alternatives condition indicated that they had more alternative
offers (M = 3.00, SD = 0.09) than those in the single alternative condi-
tion (M = 1.17, SD = 0.64), F(1,317) = 1848.57, p < 0.001. Impor-
tantly, participants in the higher-average condition reported a
higher best alternative (M = 84.87, SD = 0.79) than those in the
equal-average condition (M = 80.07, SD = 2.27), F(1,315) = 508.28,
p < 0.001. Those in the equal-average condition reported a higher
best alternative than those in the lower-average condition
(M = 74.94, SD = 0.55), F(1,315) = 589.28, p < 0.001, and those in
the single alternative condition (M = 75.05, SD = 0.51), F(1,315) =
554.89, p < 0.001. The latter two conditions did not differ (p = 0.38).
5.4.2. Perceived bargaining zone
We predicted that multiple alternatives would distort negotia-
tors’ perceived bargaining zone to a greater extent than a single
50 
60 
70 
80 
90 
100 
110 
120 
130 
140 
Single alternative 
($75) 
Higher average 
($85, $80, $75) 
Equal average 
($80, $75, $70) 
Lower average 
($75, $70, $65) 
Multiple alternatives 
M
ea
n 
re
su
lts
 in
 U
S
$ 
Perceived bargaining zone 
First offer amount 
Fig. 4. Candidates with multiple alternatives showed a relatively more distorted
bargaining zone and made lower first offers than those with a single alternative,
irrespective of whether the average of the multiple alternatives was higher, equal,
or lower. Error bars indicate ± 1 SEM.
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tiators with multiple alternatives (M = 91.20, SD = 14.52) perceived
the opponent’s reservation price to be lower than those with a sin-
gle alternative (M = 118.69, SD = 35.85), F(1,317) = 95.00, p < 0.001,
d = 1.24. The mean comparison was significant irrespective of
whether the average value was higher (M = 92.41, SD = 8.20), F
(1,315) = 57.34, p < 0.001, d = 1.00, equal to (M = 93.62,
SD = 17.92), F(1,315) = 50.40, p < 0.001, d = 0.87, or lower
(M = 87.87, SD = 15.40), F(1,315) = 80.35, p < 0.001, d = 1.11, than
the single alternative. There were no significant differences
between the three multiple alternative conditions (all ps > 0.10).
Likewise, negotiators with multiple alternatives (M = 81.46,
SD = 8.14) set a lower reservation price for themselves than those
with a single alternative (M = 92.38, SD = 25.55), F(1,317) = 33.60,
p < 0.001, d = 0.74. This difference remained robust irrespective of
whether the average value was higher (M = 84.85, SD = 6.22), F
(1,315) = 10.88, p = 0.001, d = 0.40, equal to (M = 82.97, SD = 8.56),
F(1,315) = 16.41, p < 0.001, d = 0.48, or lower (M = 76.82,
SD = 7.29), F(1,315) = 47.36, p < 0.001, d = 0.82, than the single
alternative. Own reservation prices were lower in the low average
condition than in all other conditions (all ps < 0.009). No other
effects were significant (all ps > 0.42).6 We also asked participants about their target price (i.e., the ideal price they would
like to achieve). Although target prices yielded the same pattern as reservation prices
between the single alternative and multiple alternatives conditions (p < 0.001) and5.4.3. First-offer extremity
We predicted that multiple alternatives would lead negotiators
to make the least extreme demands (Hypothesis 2). The results
supported these predictions (Fig. 4). Negotiators with multiple
alternatives (M = 93.34, SD = 11.70) made less extreme first offers
than those with a single alternative (M = 128.69, SD = 39.65), F
(1,317) = 150.84, p < 0.001, d = 1.56. This difference was significant
irrespective of whether the alternatives’ average was higher
(M = 95.44, SD = 6.16), F(1,315) = 90.12, p < 0.001, d = 1.16, equal
to (M = 95.68, SD = 13.20), F(1,315) = 84.25, p < 0.001, d = 1.09, or
lower (M = 89.22, SD = 13.24), F(1,315) = 127.01, p < 0.001,
d = 1.33, than the single alternative. There were no significant dif-
ferences between the three multiple alternatives conditions (all
ps > 0.075).correlated significantly with the reservation prices (rs > 0.52, ps < 0.001), the
perceived bargaining zone was a more robust and influential mediator for the
underlying mechanism. When jointly entered in a multiple mediation model, own
reservation price, CI95 [2.63; 0.68], and opponent reservation price, CI95 [4.08;
1.20], both resulted in a significant indirect effect. Target price did not, CI95 [1.98;
+0.11]. These results do not change when the other alternative explanations are
simultaneously entered in the model. No other measures than the ones reported here
were collected in this study.5.4.4. Mediation analyses
We conducted a multiple mediation analysis (Preacher & Hayes,
2008) to simultaneously test the hypothesized as well as the
potential alternative mechanisms of the effect of multiple alterna-
tives (versus a single alternative) on first offers. We used anorthogonal contrast as the independent variable (3 for the single
alternative; +1 for each of the multiple alternatives conditions).
The mediation analysis showed a significant indirect effect of
the contrast variable on first-offer extremity through perceived
reservation price of the opponent, CI95 [4.86; 1.67], and nego-
tiators’ own reservation price, CI95 [2.66; 0.69] (see Fig. 5).
However, none of the alternative explanations mediated. The indi-
rect effects of interpersonal justice, CI95 [0.05; +0.28], face con-
cerns, CI95 [0.17; +0.05], price confidence, CI95 [0.10; +0.13],
and perceived opponent power, CI95 [0.05; +0.15], were not sig-
nificant. Reservation prices also mediated when they were entered
in the mediation model without the alternative explanations
(Opponent RP: CI95 [5.03; 1.76]; Own RP: CI95 [2.70;
0.75]).6 Thus, negotiators with multiple alternatives made less
extreme first offers than those with a single alternative because their
perceived bargaining zone was relatively more distorted.
5.5. Discussion
Study 2 replicated the findings from Study 1 using different
anchor values and more alternatives in the multiple alternatives
condition. Negotiators with multiple alternatives made less
extreme first offers compared to those with only a single alterna-
tive. Again, this effect was mediated by a distorted view of the bar-
gaining zone (i.e., lower perceived own and opponent reservation
price). The effect was not mediated by negotiators being more con-
cerned about interpersonal justice, wanting to protect their own
face, feeling more confident about the value of the negotiation
item, or perceiving their opponent as more powerful. Importantly,
Study 2 also ruled out the possibility that negotiators merely
anchored on the average value of the alternatives by showing that
similar effects on the perceived bargaining zone and first-offer
extremity emerged, irrespective of whether the average of the
multiple alternatives was lower, equal to, or even higher than
the single alternative. Note, however, that the anchor values in
the ‘‘higher average” condition were chosen arbitrarily. Thus, the
finding of lower first offers in the ‘‘higher average” condition com-
pared to the single alternatives condition does not imply that any
set of multiple alternatives will pull down first offers and that
the value of the best alternative never matters. In contrast, past
research has repeatedly demonstrated that a higher best alterna-
tive leads to higher first offers and outcomes (Pinkley et al.,
1994; Schaerer et al., 2015; see also present Study 1). In other
words, as the value of the best alternative in the ‘‘higher average”
condition becomes substantially larger than the value of the single
alternative, the biasing effect of multiple alternatives will at some
point likely be overpowered by the positive effect of a more attrac-
tive best alternative. We return to this finding in the General
Discussion.6. Study 3: Multiple alternatives and negotiation outcomes
Although Studies 1 and 2 demonstrate that multiple alterna-
tives can distort the perceived bargaining zone and impair first
offers, they do not speak to the impact on negotiation outcomes.
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Fig. 5. Results of competing mediation model in Study 2: perceived bargaining zone (opponent and own RPs) mediated the causal relationship of negotiators’ alternatives on
first-offer extremity. Alternative explanations were ruled out. Regression coefficients are unstandardized and SEs in parentheses. RP = Reservation Price. ⁄⁄⁄ p < 0.001.
8 Analogous to Study 1, we also measured sellers’ perceived power. Power did not
differ across the two conditions, F(1,71) = 0.15, p = 0.70, d = 0.01.
9 Some participants chose a reservation price that was lower than their best
alternative. Although one would expect rational negotiators to only accept a price
that is equal to or higher than their best alternative, negotiators often consider other
idiosyncratic factors that lead them to set reservation prices below the value of their
alternative (e.g., Amanatullah, Morris, & Curhan, 2008; Pinkley et al., 1994;
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would carry through to final agreements in an interactive, face-
to-face negotiation (Hypothesis 4). Study 3 tested a serial media-
tion model in which negotiators with multiple alternatives (versus
a single alternative) claim less value because their perceived bar-
gaining zone is distorted, which then weighs down their first offer
(Hypothesis 5).
6.1. Participants and design
Participants were 174 French students in 87 dyads (mean
age = 22.46, SD = 2.94; 65.48% female) who were recruited from a
Parisian university district in exchange for €5.00. Dyads were ran-
domly assigned to a single alternative or a multiple alternatives
condition. Fourteen dyads were excluded because they did not fol-
low the instructions (e.g., did not comply with the predefined first-
offer order, invented additional bargaining issues; 4 dyads) or
because they reported extreme values (median ± 2.5 MAD; 10
dyads) for first offer and/or final agreement. Thus, the analyses
are based on the remaining 73 observations.7
6.2. Procedure and manipulations
Participants assumed the role of a seller or a buyer and negoti-
ated the price of a Starbucks logo mug (see Schaerer et al., 2015).
Sellers were equipped with a Starbucks mug and instructed to
review their alternative offer(s) before entering the negotiation
with the buyer. In the single alternative condition, sellers were told
that their alternative offer was €4.75. In the multiple alternatives
condition, sellers received four offers of €4.75, €4.25, €3.75, and
€2.25. The best alternative (i.e., €4.75) was identical in both condi-
tions. Sellers were further informed that their goal was to sell the
mug at the highest price possible and that they would be making
the first offer. Buyers received the same role instructions in both
conditions, were not given any alternatives, and were instructed
to buy the mug at the lowest price possible. Participants then
negotiated the price of the mug. No impasses occurred.
6.3. Dependent measures
After reading their role instructions but before making their
first offer, sellers reported the perceived opponent reservation7 When we analyzed the data including outliers, opponent reservation price
(p = 0.59) was not significant. However, the effects for own reservation price
(p = 0.020), first offers (p = 0.021), and outcomes (p = 0.001) persisted.price and their own reservation price in a pre-negotiation ques-
tionnaire. Upon completion of the negotiation, participants filled
in a short post-negotiation questionnaire prompting them to
report the extremity of the seller’s first offer, the final agreement,
the number of alternatives they had available (sellers only), and
demographic information.8
6.4. Results
6.4.1. Manipulation check
The manipulation was successful. Sellers in the multiple alter-
natives condition reported having more alternative offers
(M = 3.56, SD = 1.13) than those in the single alternative condition
(M = 1.05, SD = 0.65), F(1,71) = 139.14, p < 0.001.
6.4.2. Perceived bargaining zone
Hypothesis 1 was supported. Sellers with multiple alternatives
perceived the buyer’s reservation price as lower (M = 5.31,
SD = 1.81) than sellers with a single alternative (M = 6.44,
SD = 1.52), F(1,71) = 8.41, p = 0.005, d = 0.67. Sellers with multiple
alternatives also perceived their own reservation price as lower
(M = 4.15, SD = 1.01) than sellers with a single alternative
(M = 4.98, SD = 0.54), F(1,71) = 19.95, p < 0.001, d = 1.02.9
6.4.3. First-offer extremity
Hypothesis 2 was supported. Sellers with multiple alternatives
made less extreme first offers (M = 5.98, SD = 1.50) than sellers
with a single alternative (M = 8.35, SD = 2.88), F(1,71) = 18.58,
p < 0.001, d = 1.01.
6.4.4. Final agreements
We predicted that negotiators with multiple alternatives would
negotiate worse agreements than those with a single alternative
(Hypothesis 4). Indeed, sellers with multiple alternatives obtainedThompson, 2011). For example, realizing that accepting a previous offer may be
associated with additional transaction costs or closing a deal ‘‘right now” may be
more appealing than going back to an old offer and, in turn, result in lower
reservation prices than the best alternative. Thus, even rational negotiators some-
times set a reservation price that is lower than their best alternative.
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only one alternative (M = 6.17, SD = 1.24), F(1,71) = 35.62,
p < 0.001, d = 1.41.6.4.5. Mediation analysis
Mediation analysis tested Hypothesis 5, stating that multiple
alternatives (vs. a single alternative) lead to lower final agreements
because they first distort the perceived bargaining zone and then
weigh down first offers (Fig. 6). The predicted serial mediation
model was tested in two ways: First, we used path analysis
(Baron & Kenny, 1986) to test the indirect effects of the model
components. A bootstrapping procedure (5000 iterations) revealed
that perceived opponent reservation price, CI95 [1.35; 0.08], and
own reservation price, CI95 [1.24; 0.25], simultaneously medi-
ated the relationship of the alternatives manipulation (0 = single
alternative; 1 = multiple alternatives) on first-offer extremity.
First-offer extremity, in turn, mediated the effect of the alterna-
tives manipulation on final agreements, CI95 [1.14; 0.39]. In
addition, the alternatives manipulation predicted final agreements
serially through opponent reservation price and first-offer extrem-
ity, CI95 [0.43; 0.04], and through own reservation price and
first-offer extremity, CI95 [1.24; 0.25] (see Hayes, 2013; Model
6).
Second, using a structural equation model (Gatignon, 2010), the
indirect effect of the full model was tested. As expected, multiple
alternatives (vs. a single one) led to lower opponent and own reser-
vation prices, which in turn led to less extreme first offers and less
profitable agreements, CI95 [1.38; 0.59]. Thus, negotiators with
many alternatives achieved worse agreements than those with a
single alternative because their perception of the bargaining zone
was relatively more distorted, which then led them to make less
ambitious offers. These results support our proposed theory of bar-
gaining zone distortion.10 In line with the findings reported below, data analysis including outliers led to a
significant difference in the numeric condition (p = 0.019), but not when numeric and
qualitative labels were present (p = 0.36) or when only qualitative labels were present
(p = 0.08; first offers in the multiple alternatives condition were marginally higher).6.5. Discussion
Study 3 made two important contributions. First, it extended
the findings from Studies 1 and 2 by establishing the effects of bar-
gaining zone distortion on first offers in an interactive, face-to-face
negotiation. Second, Study 3 extended our findings by showing
that multiple alternatives do not only distort the perceived bar-
gaining zone and result in less extreme first offers but also shape
final negotiation agreements: compared to negotiators with a sin-
gle alternative, negotiators who had additional alternatives ended
up claiming over €1.50 (25%) less.
Together, Studies 1–3 provide consistent evidence for our bar-
gaining zone distortion model. Negotiators who had additional
alternatives reported distorted reservation prices, started with less
extreme first offers (Study 1–3) and incurred a distributive negoti-
ation disadvantage (Study 3) compared to those with a single alter-
native only. The final two studies further tested our causal modelby experimentally manipulating the proposed mechanism using
a moderation-of-process approach (Spencer et al., 2005).7. Study 4: What’s in a scale?
We theorized that the underlying scaling effect causes a partic-
ular numerical value to appear as more extreme when multiple
alternatives are present, causing negotiators to make lower initial
demands. In other words, although two negotiators may make
two objectively different first offers to their opponent, they may
in fact subjectively perceive these offers to be equally aggressive.
One way to demonstrate that different individuals may have differ-
ent representations of the underlying numeric response scale is to
provide an alternative, qualitative evaluation standard for a partic-
ular judgment (e.g., De Langhe, Puntoni, Fernandes, & Van Osselaer,
2011). Specifically, non-numeric cues that provide diagnostic
information about the absolute extremity of an offer should reduce
or eliminate distortion (see Frederick & Mochon, 2012). To test this,
we provided negotiators with an alternative evaluation basis (i.e.,
linguistic cues) for interpreting the extremity of their own first
offers. After being informed about their alternatives, negotiators
were instructed to determine the size of their first offer using (1)
a numeric scale (similar to the prior studies), (2) a qualitative scale,
or (3) both. Because scale distortion should only emerge when
comparisons are made across the exact same scales (Frederick &
Mochon, 2012), we predicted that multiple alternatives (versus a
single alternative) would only weigh down the dollar value of first
offers when negotiators select their first offers from the same
numeric scale (condition 1), but not when they are able to calibrate
the extremity of their offers using qualitative information (condi-
tions 2 and 3).
7.1. Participants and design
We recruited 302 individuals (mean age = 31.72, SD = 9.86;
37.10% female) from Mechanical Turk in exchange for $0.50 and
randomly assigned them to six conditions of a 2(Alternatives: sin-
gle vs. multiple)  3(Evaluation standard: numeric vs. numeric +
qualitative vs. qualitative) between-subjects design. Thirty-eight
participants were excluded using the same a priori determined cri-
teria as in the previous online studies, leaving 264 observations.10
7.2. Procedure, manipulations, and dependent measures
Participant had to negotiate the sales price of a CD (Schaerer
et al., 2015). Specifically, they were told that they wanted to sell
one of their old CDs and that an interested person asked for a first
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alternative offers that they had already secured. In the single alter-
native condition, the value of the alternative offer was $6.00. In the
multiple alternatives condition, participants received four alterna-
tives valued at $6.00, $5.00, $4.00, and $3.00. As in the previous
study, the best alternative was identical in both conditions.
Participants then chose their first offer on a response scale rang-
ing from $3 to $15, with one-dollar increments. The endpoints of
the scale were chosen based on the minimum and maximum offers
a different participant sample made during a pretest (N = 100). In
the numeric condition, participants made their first offer on a scale
with numeric labels only ($3, $4, $5. . .$15; see Appendix C). In the
numeric + qualitative condition, participants received additional
qualitative information that indicated the relative extremity of a
first offer ($3 = extremely low first offer, $5 = very low first offer. . .
$15 = extremely high first offer; see Appendix C). In the qualitative
condition, dollar values were removed and participants selected
their first offer on a scale with qualitative labels only (Appendix
C). Finally, participants indicated the number of alternatives they
had and completed the same attention check and demographic
questions as in Studies 1–2. No additional measures were
collected.
7.3. Results
7.3.1. Manipulation check
The manipulation was effective. Participants in the multiple
alternatives condition reported having more alternatives
(M = 3.96, SD = 0.53) than those in the single alternative condition
(M = 1.00, SD = 0.38), F(1,262) = 2,708.26, p < 0.001.
7.3.2. First-offer extremity
We predicted that negotiators with multiple alternatives would
make less extreme first offers than those with a single alternative
when they used the numeric response scale. In contrast, the pres-
ence of a qualitative scale was expected to counteract the distort-
ing influence of the bargaining zone and ultimately mitigate the
detrimental first-offer effect (two conditions with qualitative
labels). These predictions were supported (Fig. 7). In the numeric
condition, first offers were lower for negotiators with multiple
alternatives (M = 7.80, SD = 1.62) than for negotiators with a single
alternative (M = 8.83, SD = 1.50), F(1,258) = 10.40, p < 0.001,
d = 0.86, replicating Hypothesis 2. However, when participants
received numeric and qualitative scales, first offers of multiple-
alternatives negotiators were no longer significantly different5 
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Fig. 7. Study 4: Negotiators with multiple alternatives made lower first offers than
those with a single alternative, but only when they used a numeric scale. Error bars
indicate ± 1 SEM. Asterisks indicate sig. differences between conditions
(⁄⁄⁄ p < 0.001).(M = 9.12, SD = 1.78) from single-alternative negotiators
(M = 9.57, SD = 1.53), F(1,258) = 2.18, p = 0.14, d = 0.27. Similarly,
when only a qualitative scale was presented, negotiators with mul-
tiple alternatives (M = 10.75, SD = 1.15) did not make lower first
offers than those with a single alternative (M = 11.27, SD = 1.31),
F(1,258) = 2.27, p = 0.13, d = 0.42. Overall, these patterns produced
a marginally significant main effect of the alternatives manipula-
tion, F(1,258) = 2.96, p = 0.087, a significant main effect of the eval-
uation basis manipulation, F(2,258) = 66.19, p < 0.001, and a
significant interaction effect, F(2,258) = 5.50, p = 0.005, gp2 = 0.041.7.4. Discussion
Study 4 provided a direct, causal test of our bargaining zone dis-
tortion model by experimentally manipulating the evaluation basis
of the first offer. The finding that negotiators with multiple alterna-
tives only made lower first offers when they used a numeric scale
is consistent with the idea that scale distortion should only emerge
when comparisons are made across the exact same (numerical)
scale (Frederick & Mochon, 2012). Thus, these findings support
our theoretical model assuming that multiple numerical anchor
values distort the perceived bargaining zone and result in less
extreme first offers.8. Study 5: The moderating role of making the first offer
Our theoretical model further proposes that bargaining zone
distortion occurs when negotiators estimate reservation prices
and determine first offers immediately after exposure to their
numerical alternative(s). Indeed, scale distortion should be most
consequential when an exposure to initial anchors is immediately
followed by a subsequent estimation (Frederick & Mochon, 2012).
This assumption implies that the differences between multiple
alternatives and a single alternative should be particularly strong
when negotiators make the first offer. If negotiators move second,
however, they are more likely to rely on the opponents’ first offer
as a proxy for their own first offer and less likely to rely on their
own alternatives. To disrupt scale distortion, we therefore
instructed negotiators to make the first offer (as in Studies 1–4)
or to let their opponent move first. We predicted that multiple
alternatives and a single alternative would only have different
effects on first offers and outcomes when negotiators make the
first offer but not when they receive it. A second goal was to test
our predictions with a sample of experienced professionals.8.1. Participants and design
Participants were 350 professionals (mean age = 29.16;
SD = 2.45; 28.3% female) pursuing an MBA at a global business
school. The negotiation was part of an introductory leadership
class in the first semester of the program. Participants completed
the negotiation in dyads as part of their class preparations. The
resulting 175 dyads were randomly assigned to a 2(Alternatives:
one vs. multiple)  2(First mover: candidate vs. recruiter)
between-subjects factorial design. Analogous to Study 4, we
excluded 23 dyads that did not follow the instructions (e.g., agree-
ment outside the task boundaries, dependent measures not
reported; N = 3) or reported extreme values (median ± 2.5 MAD,
N = 20) for first offers and/or final agreements, leaving 152 dyads
for our analyses.1111 When outliers were included, first offers (p = 0.087) were marginally lower and
outcomes (p = 0.032) significantly lower in the multiple alternatives condition than in
the single alternatives condition when focal negotiators moved first, but not when the
opponent made the first offer (ps > 0.39).
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The study was conducted over email using a scenario adapted
from Galinsky and Mussweiler (2001). The interaction involved a
single-issue negotiation of a bonus between a job candidate and
a recruiter. Participants in both roles were told that they had
already agreed on most terms of the job offer (salary, starting date,
benefits) but that the signing bonus was yet to be discussed. Partic-
ipants were given five days to complete the negotiation and could
exchange as many emails as they wanted to.
8.3. Experimental manipulations
8.3.1. Alternatives manipulation
Participants in the candidate role were randomly assigned to
one of two conditions. Candidates in the single alternative condition
were told that they had secured a job offer at a comparable firm
with a signing bonus of €9000. Candidates in the multiple alterna-
tives condition were told that they had secured four job offers at
comparable firms with signing bonuses of €9000, €8000, €6000,
and €5000, respectively. The best alternative was identical across
the two conditions. Participants in the role of the recruiter were
always told that the bonuses offered by their company have aver-
aged €10,000 in the past, that they should aim to pay as little as
possible, and that they would prefer to hire another candidate if
they cannot settle for a bonus of €25,000 or less.
8.3.2. First-offer manipulation
For half of the dyads, the job candidate received the contact
information of the recruiter and was instructed to reach out to
the recruiter by email with a first offer. For the other half of the
dyads, the recruiter was instructed to move first.
8.4. Dependent measures
Upon completion of the negotiation, dyads reported their first
offers and negotiation outcomes to the course assistant. No addi-
tional variables were collected.
8.5. Results
8.5.1. Impasses
Of the 152 dyads, eight dyads did not reach an agreement. The
number of impasses was not significantly different across the four
cells, v2(3, N = 158) = 3.20, p = 0.36. Tripp and Sondak (1992) rec-
ommended that ‘‘if subjects have been given an alternative, then
the value of that alternative should be used” (p. 277). In this study,
all candidates were told that ‘‘if you do not reach an agreement in
the negotiation [. . .], you will take the (one of the) other job offer
(s). . .”. Thus, because we manipulated the role materials of the
job candidates and were interested in their performance, we
assigned candidates the value of their best alternative (€9000) as
the negotiation outcome when they reached an impasse.12
8.5.2. Candidates’ first-offer extremity
As predicted, when candidatesmoved first, their first offers were
less extreme when they had multiple alternatives (M = 16,783,
SD = 4935) than when they only had a single alternative
(M = 20,676, SD = 6807), F(1,148) = 9.40, p = 0.003, d = 0.64. How-
ever, when candidates were instructed to wait for the recruiter12 The direction and significance of the results did not change when we instead
excluded dyads with an impasse. First offers (p = 0.001) and outcomes (p < 0.001)
were significantly lower in the multiple alternatives condition than in the single
alternatives condition when focal negotiators moved first, but not when the opponent
made the first offer (ps > 0.60).to move first, candidates’ offers no longer differed between the
multiple alternatives condition (M = 16,258, SD = 4112) and the
single alternative condition (M = 16,871, SD = 5348), F(1,148) =
0.25, p = 0.62. These main effects were qualified by a marginally
significant two-way interaction, F(1,148) = 3.44, p = 0.065,
gp2 = 0.02.
8.5.3. Final agreement
We predicted similar patterns for final agreements and the
results in Fig. 8 support this prediction. When instructed to move
first, candidates with multiple alternatives negotiated lower sign-
ing bonuses (M = 11,472, SD = 2359) than candidates with only a
single alternative (M = 14,905, SD = 4572), F(1,148) = 18.80,
p < 0.001, d = 0.91. However, when candidates were instructed to
wait for the recruiter to move first, those with multiple alternatives
(M = 12,764, SD = 2843) performed as well as those with a single
alternative (M = 12,409, SD = 3144), F(1,148) = 0.22, p = 0.64. These
patterns produced a significant interaction effect, F(1,148) = 11.81,
p < 0.001, g2p = 0.07.
8.5.4. Mediation analysis
We ran a moderated mediation model (Hayes, 2013; Model 8)
to test our prediction that the detrimental effect of multiple alter-
natives on final agreements was mediated by the extremity of can-
didates’ first offers. Candidates’ number of alternatives was used as
the independent variable, their first-offer extremity as the mediat-
ing variable, final agreement as the dependent measure, and first-
mover order as the moderating variable. A bootstrapping proce-
dure with 5000 resamples and a 95% bias-corrected bootstrap con-
fidence interval (Preacher & Hayes, 2004) confirmed that having
additional alternatives negatively affected negotiation outcomes
through candidates’ first offers when candidates moved first, CI95
[2,233.28; 362.81], but not when recruiters moved first, CI95
[887.46; +476.47].
8.6. Discussion
Study 5 supported the assumption of our theoretical model that
bargaining zone distortion only emerges when negotiators deter-
mine their first offers immediately following the exposure to
numerical alternatives. Indeed, the number of alternatives only
affected offers and outcomes when negotiators based their first
offer on their own multiple alternatives. However, when they were
provided with information from their opponent before making
their offer, the number of alternatives no longer impaired the
extremity of their first offer or their negotiation outcomes.8 
Candidate moved first Candidate moved second 
Fig. 8. Candidates with multiple alternatives reached lower agreements than those
with a single alternative, but only when they moved first. Error bars indicate ± 1
SEM.
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Practical guidebooks, negotiation theory, and people’s lay
perceptions all suggest that negotiators prefer having multiple
alternatives over a single alternative—likely because negotiators
expect to attain better deals when they have more than one
alternative. Across five simulated and interactive negotiations
conducted over email and face-to-face, we found that these lay
intuitions may be inaccurate. We found consistent evidence that
negotiators who had multiple alternatives, as opposed to those
who only had a single alternative, made less ambitious first offers,
even though parties’ best alternatives were identical across condi-
tions (Studies 1–5). Notably, negotiators with multiple alternatives
also made less extreme first offers when the average value of
multiple alternatives was equal to or even higher than the value
of the single alternative, allowing us to rule out that people simply
anchor on the average value when they are exposed to multiple
anchors (Study 2). Less extreme first offers, in turn, led to less
profitable negotiation agreements (Studies 3 and 5). In sum, the
present studies are the first to show that multiple alternatives
can lead to a distributive disadvantage in negotiations.
To account for these paradoxical effects, we proposed a bargain-
ing zone distortion model. According to this model, the influence of
alternatives on negotiators’ perceptions of their own and their
opponents’ reservation prices can be characterized as a scaling
effect, leading to a greater downward distortion of the perceived
bargaining zone for multiple alternatives versus a single alterna-
tive. The distorted bargaining zone, in turn, causes first offers to
be less extreme and final outcomes to be less profitable. Our stud-
ies provide compelling evidence for this model. First, we found
negotiators’ perceptions of their own and their opponents’ reserva-
tion prices were more distorted in the presence of additional
alternatives and that these perceptions mediated the effect of
alternatives on first-offer extremity (Studies 1–3). The remaining
studies demonstrated scale distortion as a key mechanism, show-
ing that multiple alternatives did not lead to a relative downward
distortion when negotiators used an alternative evaluation stan-
dard to determine their offers (Study 4), and when the determina-
tion of the first offer was not immediately preceded by negotiators’
own alternatives (Study 5).9.1. The role of multiple alternatives in negotiation
Our findings contribute to theory and research in a number of
important ways. First, the present research speaks to negotiation
research examining the role of alternatives in predicting negotia-
tion outcomes (for a review, see Kim, Pinkley, & Fragale, 2005).
We complement and extend recent research illustrating the para-
doxical nature of alternatives in distributive negotiations.
Schaerer et al. (2015) demonstrated the two distinct forces that
alternatives can exert: alternatives not only provide feelings of
power but also serve as salient anchors that can affect the size of
first offers. The present research extends these findings by focusing
on the impact of multiple alternatives rather than the value of only
a single alternative. In other words, whereas Schaerer et al. (2015)
examined how the value (or quality) and mere existence of an
alternative affects negotiations, the present studies focus on the
number (or quantity) of alternatives. In doing so, the present
research demonstrates that alternatives exert a scaling effect that
changes the cognitive representation of the underlying response
scale that negotiators face when making a first offer (i.e., the
perceived bargaining zone).
Our findings also have implications for another widely held
assumption in the negotiations literature: the idea that a negotia-
tor’s best alternative to a negotiated agreement, or BATNA, is thedriving force behind a negotiator’s success (Fisher & Ury, 1981).
According to this view, multiple alternatives should not lead to
worse outcomes compared to a single alternative when the best
alternative is equally high across conditions. In contrast, our bar-
gaining zone distortion account suggests that even alternatives
that could be seen as irrelevant (i.e., less valuable alternatives than
the best alternative) have a pervasive impact on negotiators’ cogni-
tion. It is possible that negotiators need to make a conscious effort
to focus on their best alternative and to disregard all other alterna-
tives. Indeed, negotiators are often advised to identify and focus on
their best alternative exclusively when they prepare for negotia-
tions (e.g., Thompson, 2011). To explore this possibility, we ran
an additional study (see Appendix D for detailed procedure and
results), in which negotiators with multiple alternatives were
explicitly informed that ‘‘the only alternative offer that should
inform your negotiation is your best offer” and that they should
‘‘disregard all other offers.” The distorting effect of multiple alter-
natives was robust and immune to this strategy: focusing on the
best alternative did not lead to an improvement of their first offers.
Importantly, these findings do not suggest that BATNAs are irrele-
vant. There is robust evidence that a strong BATNA (compared to a
weak or no BATNA) can lead to a considerable distributive advan-
tage (e.g., Pinkley et al., 1994; Schaerer et al., 2015). However, our
findings do suggest that negotiators find it hard to discount alter-
natives of lower value – even when explicitly told to ignore them.
9.2. Explaining anchoring effects in negotiation
Extant negotiation research has typically relied on anchoring-
and-adjustment (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2006) or selective acces-
sibility processes (Chapman & Johnson, 1994, 1999; Mussweiler
& Strack, 2000, 2001; Strack & Mussweiler, 1997) to explain how
negotiators are influenced by numerical anchors. Although these
schools of thought can readily explain, for example, why more
ambitious first offers can lead to better outcomes (Galinsky &
Mussweiler, 2001) or why a low BATNA can weigh down a negotia-
tor’s first offer (Schaerer et al., 2015), neither framework offers a
compelling explanation for our multiple-anchors effect. Both
schools of thought rely on the assumption that anchoring effects
occur whenever an anchor value falls outside a plausible range.
Anchoring-and-adjustment predicts that people adjust away from
an anchor until ‘‘they reach the nearest edge of some implicit range
of plausible values” (Epley & Gilovich, 2006, p. 312). When people
reach this plausible estimate they terminate the adjustment pro-
cess, which is often insufficient. In our studies, the presence of
weaker anchors in the multiple alternatives conditions (e.g., $75
vs. $75, $70, $65 in Study 2) could have caused negotiators to
adjust away from a lower starting point – increasing the likelihood
that an anchor value would fall outside the plausible range and
that adjustments are insufficient. However, the effects of multiple
alternatives were virtually identical when the lowest alternative
was equal to the value of the single alternative (e.g., $75 vs. $75,
$80, $85 in Study 2).
Selective accessibility relies on the assumption that whenever a
value falls outside a plausible range, ‘‘participants test the possibil-
ity that the target possesses the anchor value and try to construct a
mental model that includes information that is maximally consis-
tent with the anchor value” (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997, p. 444). It
is not evident how in the present studies the exposure to addi-
tional, less extreme negotiation alternatives would activate this
process differentially (see also Ames & Mason, 2015; Mochon &
Frederick, 2013). Scale distortion theory, on the other hand, is a
novel account that does not rely on the assumption that people test
an anchor value against a plausible range or that anchors change
the underlying representation of a negotiation item. Instead, scale
distortion implies that anchors affect the subjective response scale
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fied as the number of reference points increases. It is nevertheless
possible that other established anchoring mechanisms such as
anchoring-and-adjustment and selective accessibility can operate
simultaneously with, or in lieu of, scale distortion. This may likely
depend on the level of uncertainty associated with the negotiation
context. Further research is needed to examine whether, when,
and why these processes substitute each other or operate
simultaneously.
9.3. Perceived bargaining zone as antecedent of first offers
The current research also contributes to the literature on first
offers. In recent years, research on first offers in negotiations has
exploded. Although this literature has found that men generally
ask for more than women (Barron, 2003) and anxiety negatively
affects first-offer aspirations (Brooks & Schweitzer, 2011), the
majority of studies on first offers have investigated the conse-
quences of first offers (e.g., Ames & Mason, 2015; Loschelder,
Stuppi, & Troetschel, 2013; Loschelder, Trötschel, Swaab, Friese, &
Galinsky, 2016). Considering that first offers can explain a signifi-
cant share of the variance in negotiation outcomes (Galinsky &
Mussweiler, 2001), we know remarkably little about their antece-
dents. The present theory and corroborating data illustrate that
negotiators’ perceived bargaining zone is a key determinant of
first-offer extremity and final agreements. Although two negotia-
tors may have the same goals and identical underlying representa-
tions of a particular negotiation issue, a distorted representation of
the bargaining zone can set negotiators up for failure.
9.4. Practical implications
The present findings also have implications for practitioners.
Even though the detrimental effect of multiple negotiation alterna-
tives seems to suggest that parties should refrain from collecting
alternative offers, this is not what we would recommend by
default. Instead, the present research reinforces the idea that nego-
tiators need to be aware of the dual role that alternatives play.
Contrary to the lay perception that multiple alternatives come with
a distributive advantage, we show that they exert a strong distor-
tion effect on parties’ perceived bargaining zone and subsequent
first offers. Our findings suggest that negotiators may be best off
by pursuing a sequential approach to realize the elusive power that
multiple alternatives appear to provide without negatively affect-
ing their initial requests. One way to do so could be for negotiators
to first select an initial offer based on their goals (see also Jäger,
Loschelder, & Friese, 2015) and only then to generate alternatives
as a safety net. Such an approach would prevent them from
downward-adjusting their first offer based on emerging alternative
offers.
9.5. Limitations and future directions
Although the present studies provide consistent support for our
theoretical model, they have some limitations that open exciting
avenues for future research. For instance, the present findings are
likely limited (as are all anchoring effects) to a minimal degree of
uncertainty. Although uncertainty is quite common in negotia-
tions, as reservation prices are generally difficult or even impossi-
ble to obtain (e.g., Bottom, 1998; Srivastava, Chakravarti, &
Rapoport, 2000; Thompson, 2011), future research could examine
whether our effects persist when there is relatively little uncer-
tainty. We expect that the adverse impact of multiple alternatives
on first offers and outcomes is likely to be weaker when, for
instance, negotiators are aware that the opponent has strong alter-
natives (Schaerer et al., 2015), when the actual bargaining zone issmaller than the perceived bargaining zone (Larrick & Wu, 2007),
or when negotiators disclose their own alternatives to the counter-
part (Pinkley, 1995).
Another assumption of our bargaining zone distortion model is
that it pertains to cases in which the best alternative is the same
across conditions and the additional alternative(s) in the multiple
alternatives condition is (are) less attractive than the best alterna-
tive. In Study 3, for example, the three additional values (€4.25,
€3.75, €2.25) in the multiple alternatives condition were lower
than the best alternative that was identical across both conditions
(€4.75). Although we found in another study (Study 2) that the
multiple alternatives in a ‘‘higher average” condition still led to
lower first offers than a single alternative, we do not mean to imply
that any set of multiple alternatives would always lead to worse
outcomes than a single one. To the contrary: If the best alternative
of multiple alternatives is markedly higher than the single alterna-
tive (e.g., €4.75 vs. €10.00, €4.25, €3.75, €2.25), then the offer-
boosting effect of a higher BATNA value will likely overshadow
any distortion effect that we found consistently for equal best
alternatives (i.e., €4.75 vs. €4.75, €4.25, €3.75, €2.25). Future
research could investigate at which point the offer-boosting
BATNA effect (Pinkley et al., 1994; Schaerer et al., 2015) outweighs
the present distortion effect.
Given the counterintuitive nature of our findings, Studies 4 and
5 tested theoretically motivated manipulations of the underlying
process rather than more practical interventions. Thus, future
research could identify more applied interventions that are easy
to implement and have broad practical appeal. For example, the
de-biasing strategy of scale labeling in Study 4 suggests that the
influence of numerically represented alternatives on first offers
should decrease the more a negotiator is certain of what a ‘‘reason-
able” offer and negotiation outcome look like. Although past
research suggests that both novice and expert negotiators are
equally affected by anchors (Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2005;
Northcraft & Neale, 1987) and our final study used a professional
sample with an ecologically valid negotiation scenario, future
research could examine more thoroughly whether our results
would vary in domains where negotiator expertise plays a more
important role (see also Loschelder, Friese, Schaerer, & Galinsky,
in press). Future research could also manipulate whether negotia-
tors conceptualize alternatives as an information source for their
offers or merely as a ‘‘cushion” that allows them to be bold and
take risks during the negotiation. Multiple alternatives may turn
out to be an advantage in the latter case.
Finally, although our studies focus predominantly on the seller
role, we expect that the same logic applies to buyers. Buyers face
the same structural situation as sellers: they have alternatives,
construe a bargaining zone, and make first offers based on this
information. Indeed, a plethora of negotiation research suggests
that first offers tend to function in a similar way for both sellers
and buyers (e.g., Galinsky & Mussweiler, 2001; Loschelder et al.,
2013; Moran & Ritov, 2002).10. Conclusion
Negotiation alternatives are an important source of leverage at
the bargaining table. However, in their pursuit of a distributive
advantage, negotiators tend to neglect that alternatives may also
affect their subjective judgment of the bargaining zone. We devel-
oped and tested a bargaining zone distortion model to explain why
– although negotiators tend to have a preference for more over
fewer alternatives – multiple alternatives can cause parties to
negotiate less aggressively and less effectively at the same time.
The presence of additional alternatives can result in a distorted
perception of the bargaining zone, less extreme first offers and less
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quench the thirst for ever-increasing power can put negotiators
at a distributive disadvantage.
Appendix A. Lay perception study
A.1. Participants
Participants were 55 professionals (mean age = 31.84,
SD = 5.41; 25.5% female) pursuing a Master’s of Business Adminis-
tration (MBA) at an international business school. Participants had
an average of 8.14 (SD = 5.54) years of professional experience.
A.2. Procedure and measures
Participants received a survey asking them to imagine that they
were about to graduate from their MBA program. Their last inter-
view had turned into a job offer, and the only remaining order of
business was the salary negotiation with the company who wanted
to hire them. Participants were then presented with two different
scenarios. In Scenario 1, they were told that they had secured
another job offer valued at €86,600. The job offer amount was
the mean salary taken from the business school’s most recent
MBA employment report. In Scenario 2, they were informed that
they had obtained four job offers (€86,600, €86,400, €84,800, and
€84,400). We kept the best alternative identical across both scenar-
ios, as this is the most conservative comparison to detect potential
misconceptions about the upside of multiple alternatives.
After familiarizing themselves with the scenarios, participants
indicated on a single item how powerful (1 = not at all powerful;
7 = very powerful) they would feel in each of the two scenarios,
how their negotiation outcome would look like (1 = poor negotia-
tion outcome; 7 = great negotiation outcome) for each of the two sce-
narios, and which scenario they would prefer. Finally, participants
reported demographic information. No other measures were
collected.
A.3. Results and discussion
Participants expected to feel more powerful when they had
multiple alternatives (M = 6.07, SD = 1.10) than when they
had only a single alternative offer (M = 4.51, SD = 1.30),F(1,54) = 104.44, p < 0.001, d = 1.30. Participants also believed that
they would negotiate a better deal with multiple alternatives
(M = 5.80, SD = 1.08) than with a single alternative (M = 4.87,
SD = 1.20), F(1,54) = 35.61, p < 0.001, d = 0.81. Finally, a large
majority (85.5%) preferred multiple alternatives over one alterna-
tive (14.5%).
Appendix B. Role materials of Studies 1–2
Email message participants received from potential buyer:
Hi there,
I’m looking for a coffee machine and just saw that you are selling
yours.
You mentioned that the price is negotiable. Can you make an initial
offer?
Thanks,
Jessica
Voicemail messages participants listened to (alternative values,
recorded voice, and presentation order randomized):
Hello, this is Joanna Parker. I came across your ad and wanted to
make you an offer for the espresso machine. I can pay ___ dollars
for it. Let me know if you are willing to accept this offer of ___ dol-
lars. Have a good day.
Good afternoon, my name is Erica Martinez. I would like to make
you an offer for the espresso machine you have for sale. I could
pay ___ dollars for the machine. Let me know if you would like
to accept my offer of ___ dollars. Goodbye.
Hi there, my name is Cindy Miller. I saw your ad and would like to
make you an offer for your espresso machine. I’m willing to pay ___
dollars for the machine. Let me know if you want to accept my offer
of ___ dollars. Bye. (Last message presented in Study 2 only)Appendix C. Schematic representation of the response scales
used in Study 4
170 M. Schaerer et al. / Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 137 (2016) 156–171Appendix D. Focus on best alternativeD.1. Method
D.1.1. Participants
Participants were 150 participants on Mechanical Turk (mean
age = 31.82, SD = 8.63; 39.3% female) who participated in an aca-
demic study in exchange for $0.45. Five participants were excluded
using the exact same exclusion procedure as in Study 4, leaving a
total of 145 observations.
D.1.2. Procedure
Participants encountered the same task as in Study 4 with three
exceptions. First, all negotiators made their first offer on a numer-
ical scale (the baseline condition in Study 4). Second, to rule out the
alternative explanation that negotiators’ expectations about future
alternatives may vary as a function of the number of alternatives,
we explicitly told all negotiators that they should ‘‘not expect addi-
tional alternative offers to become available in the future.” Third,
participants were randomly assigned to three conditions. In addi-
tion to the single alternatives condition and the multiple alternatives
condition used in Study 4, we also included a BATNA-focus condition
which was identical to the multiple alternatives condition except
that participants received additional instructions that asked them
to focus on their best alternative:
‘‘When making your first offer to the buyer, you should only
focus on the best offer that you have received and ignore the
value of the other offers. Thus, the only alternative offer that
should inform your negotiation is your best offer. You can dis-
regard all other offers.”D.1.3. First offer
Next, participants indicated their first offer on the same 13-item
scale used in Study 4. The scale had $1 increments ranging from $3
to $15.
D.1.4. Manipulation checks
Participants indicated whether they ‘‘could expect additional
alternatives to become available in the future” (0 = No; 1 = Yes).
They also indicated how many alternative offers they had received
and what the value of their best alternative was. Then, they indi-
cated whether they were instructed to ‘‘focus only on your [their]
best alternative offer” (1 = not at all; 7 = to a great extent).
Finally, participants reported demographic information. No
other measures were collected.
D.2. Results
D.2.1. Manipulation check
Future expectations about additional alternatives did not drive
our results. Although some participants (22.8%) incorrectly recalled
whether they could expect alternatives in the future (the correct
answer was ‘‘no”), the majority (77.2%) of participants operated
under the assumption that there would be no additional alterna-
tives. Importantly, the percentage of incorrect responses did not
differ between the single alternative and multiple alternatives con-
ditions (p = 0.95). To further test the robustness of our findings, we
also analyzed first offers excluding those who thought that there
might be other alternatives available and found identical results
(all ps < 0.009).
Our alternatives manipulation was successful. Participants in
the single alternative condition reported to have fewer alternatives
(M = 0.91, SD = 0.46) than those in the multiple alternatives condi-
tion (M = 3.87, SD = 0.93), F(1,142) = 394.18, p < 0.001, and those in
the BATNA-focus condition (M = 3.73, SD = 0.69), F(1,142) = 380.21,p < 0.001. The latter two conditions did not differ (p = 0.34). As
expected, participants’ recall of their best alternative did not signif-
icantly differ across conditions (all ps > 0.12).
Finally, our BATNA-focus manipulation was successful. Partici-
pants in the BATNA-focus condition reported that they focused
on their best alternative to a greater extent (M = 6.29, SD = 1.67)
than those in the single alternative condition (M = 3.83,
SD = 2.21), F(1,142) = 69.54, p < 0.001, and those in the multiple
alternatives condition (M = 2.87, SD = 2.19), F(1,142) = 36.37,
p < 0.001. Those in the single alternatives condition naturally also
focused more on their best alternative than those in the multiple
alternatives condition (p = 0.024), because the former condition
only had one alternative.
D.2.2. First offer
Replicating our previous studies, participants in the multiple
alternatives condition made lower first offers (M = 7.89,
SD = 1.25) than those in the single alternative offer (M = 8.74,
SD = 1.91), F(1,142) = 5.46, p = 0.021, d = 0.53. We also found that
participants with multiple alternatives who were explicitly
instructed to focus only on their best alternative still made lower
first offers (M = 7.79, SD = 1.99) than those with a single alterna-
tive, F(1,142) = 7.28, p = 0.008, d = 0.49, and did not differ from
those with multiple alternatives but who were not instructed to
focus on their best alternative (p = 0.77).
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